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BOOK REVIEWS
The Spirit of the Legal Profession. By Robert N. Wilkin. New
Haven: Yale University Press, published for the College of Law
of the Ohio State University. 1938. Pp. viii, 178. $2.50.
Before the fifteen hundreds the English lawyer was first a priest
and then a member of a guild, but the notion of a "profession" in the
present use was born with the modern age. It is accepted that one
mark of a profession is that its votaries have a consciousness of being
set apart from other men in a group consecrated to a special ideal.
This professional "spirit", it appears, can readily be maintained by our
English brothers, even in the stresses of the shuttlecock world of today.
The independent and aristocratic position of the barrister, and the sedulously preserved pageantry of wigs, gowns, and processions, make the
public too conscious of the lawyers as a class apart, for the lawyer
himself to be oblivious of it. But in this country where almost every
lawyer devotes a large part of his time to activities which are hardly
distinguishable from those of businessmen, we cannot escape uneasy
doubts as to how far the generality of lawyers really feel any "spirit"
of special consecration or sacrificial responsibility, different in kind
from the devotion of the credit manager or the traveling salesman to
the standards accepted in his calling.
The bar associations have called upon the law schools to assume
the duty of indoctrinating their students with this group consciousness
and these ideals and standards, which we regard as the special heritage
and hall-marks of the profession. This is no easy undertaking for the
schools. Away from the tasks and conflicts, the temptations and rewards of the lawyer's life in- office and court, the teaching of the ideals
and standards can seldom have the urgency and impact which later
the word or the example of some senior in the practice will carry. In
the hope of enlivening this teaching with the needed emotional leaven,
it is not unusual for the schools to invite leaders of the bar to address
the students upon the spirit and traditions of the profession. Frequently, however, such addresses are hasty compilations of platitudes
and counsels of perfection, which give an impression that the speaker
does not say what he believes, but what he would like his audience to
think he believes. The book of lectures under review offers a refreshing contrast to such empty and stereotyped addresses. It bears the
marks of study and reflection, and of the sincerity which, in stressing
the glories, will not gloss the failures of the profession. The first three
parts picture the rise of lawyers as a professional class in Rome, in
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England, and in America, and their role in molding the traditions of
order and liberty under which we live. The historical statements occasionally suffer from reliance upon outmoded authorities, as where the
author attributes an Anglo-Saxon, rather than a Norman origin to
the institution of jury trial (p. 35), but the treatment is quite adequate
to the purpose of indicating the development of professional spirit by
high-lighting a few heroic figures and some significant advances.
In the final part the author describes the infltiences which have made
for professional disintegration. The industrialization of the national
economy, the greed of pelf which the lawyer was called upon to serve,
the counter-swing (in reaction from plutocracy) from national unity
under representative government to the extremes of democracy, which
has its most corrosive effect upon professional spirit in the substitution
of judges dependent on popular choice for the independent judge of
our inherited tradition. On the brighter side he finds a saving remnant of lawyers who have kept the faith in the darkest days of exploitation. "In spite of the self-seeking of politicians, they did not
lust for power; in spite of the greed of industrialists, they did not become the victims of avarice. With gracious generosity they stood by
and allowed the fruits of their own wisdom and effort to be garnered
by ungrateful clients. They served the rich and the poor, the high and
the low, with true professional indifference to class or caste. Without
fanfare or parade, with little concerted effort and no 'drives,' mindful
of the shortness of life and the futility of most human effort, they
patiently adhered to the service of the law and the best traditions of
their calling."
Moreover, he looks for no lessening of the lawyer's role or of the
need for a quickened fire of professional zeal. That extension of individual reason and conscience into rules of decision under new and
changing circumstances, which we call the growth of the law, must
still go on under the guiding hand of the lawyer. New and ever wider
fields must be cultivated; there must be a reign of law instead of a
reign of strife between laborer and employer, and between nation and
nation.
Finally, the spirit which will animate the profession for these great
emprises must be continually -re-lighted at the torch of the school. "If
the world is to continue to have men who, in the words of Justice
Holmes, can live greatly in the law, drink the bitter cup of heroism,
and wear their hearts out after the unattainable, we must preserve
the means of charging men with the spirit of the profession. Mainly
we must rely on the schools. But the schools must be more intimately
supported by the leaders of the profession. That spirit is transmitted,
now as always, by association. It cannot be taught like the rule in
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Shelley's case, or the definition of murder. It is too great and too
vital for definition. We cannot tell exactly how it passes or whom
it favors. It is nothing to be dogmatic about. It eludes too definite
effort. Being spirit, it moves in spiritual ways. The best way to gain
it is to admire it, for what we admire we unconsciously emulate."
CHARLES T. McCoRMICK.
Northwestern University School of Law,
Chicago, Ill.
Our Eleven Chief Justices. By Kenneth B. Umbreit.
Harper and Brothers. 1938. Pp. xiv, 539. $3.75.

New York:

These individual biographies of those men who have headed the
Supreme Court of the United States blend into a composite history of
the Court that reads almost like a Horatio Alger tale. Originally
booted about by outstanding revolutionaries who declined the office to
sit in state legislatures, the position of Chief Justice rose under the deft,
sure guidance of Marshall to its present signal importance. Marshall
breathed such a lusty breath of life into a Court that had previously
been an executive adjunct, that the judicial branch soon grew to a
stature equally as full as that of the legislative and the executive.
With no armed force to enforce its decrees, with its jurisdiction subject to extensive legislative paring, and with its members appointed
by the executive, the Supreme Court has maintained its power and
prestige as an equal and separate division of government almost entirely by the respect it has engendered. With the recent controversy
about the Court gradually subsiding, timely indeed is this study of
the effect of the personal equation, as revealed in the lives of the Chief
Justices, on the growth and development of the Court and of American law.
At the outset the author disclaims any intent to expound the "breakfast theory" of jurisprudence, i.e., that the decisions of a judge are so
closely affected by his character, background, and point of view that
even so small a matter as his breakfast may affect the way he thinks
and feels about judicial matters during the day. The volume succeeds
a little too admirably in avoiding the "breakfast" theory. Admittedly
at times a Chief Justice's decision on broad constitutional policies cannot be explained by the man's background of prior training, associations, and prejudices. Yet in most instances there seems to be a direct relation between that background and judicial attitude in interpreting the Constitution. In these instances the author, where he assumes that cold, pure logic governs the judicial attitude, denies in
effect that personal equation which he himself asserts to be so important in the growth of the law,
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Though an apparent sympathy with his subjects inclines the author

to gloss a bit too lightly over the occasional defects that appear in his
characters, the lives and times of the Chief Justices are adequately and
fully presented. Legendary figures of history become bone-and-sinew
men. As these figures and personalities come alive, the expression
"law is a living thing" takes on new meaning. The cross-section of
American political and legal history here revealed indeed "is a rich
one" (p. xiv).
CLARENCE A. GRIFFIN, JR.
Book Review Editor.
Cardozo and Frontiers of Legal Thinking. By Beryl Harold Levy.

New York: Oxford University Press. 1938. Pp. xv, 315. $2.50.
This volume was published a short while before the death of Mr.

Justice Cardozo. It is divided into two main parts: the first, comprising somewhat less than half of the book, contains the main textual
material; and the second consists of twenty-two opinions, all except
one of which were written by Mr. Justice Cardozo while he was a
member of the New York Court of Appeals. These opinions are preceded by a brief introductory comment. Each deals with a different
subject and they were selected with a view to affording the reader a
broad and accurate view of Mr. Justice Cardozo's judicial qualities.
They are indicative of the remarkable breadth of his learning in both
public and private law. This feature of the book is of special value
to laymen who lack a general familiarity with the legal opinions of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, but it will serve as a convenient aid-to lawyers as well.
The author's real contribution is in the first division of the book,
which in turn consists of three separate parts: Cardozo in Contemporary Jurisprudence, Doing Justice, and The Judge as an Artist. The
opening chapter contains brief and interesting biographical data which
were verified by Mr. Justice Cardozo a short time before his death.
It is obvious that the author is a thorough student of the subject
in which lies his chief interest in the development of the volume under
review: "the philosophic approach to modern American jurisprudence"
-the theme which pervades the whole work. He analyzes Mr. lustice Cardozo's writings, and against that background discusses them in
their relationship to the judicial process and the development of modem American law. There is a discussion of the "dying myth" that
judges do not make law, and the reasons for the persistence of the
myth are set forth in detail and in an interesting fashion.
Perhaps the principal contribution is in the section dealing with the
judge as an artist: in constructing his opinions, in reshaping the body
of the law, and in moulding society. Although it is doubtful whether
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one could have a subject more appropriate for such an exposition, the
author has fully measured up to his opportunity. Cardozo was indeed
an artist, a fact which one appreciates to the fullest after reading this
book.
Whatever else may be written about Cardozo, this book will retain
an important place in the literature concerning his thought and his
place in the development of American law. Its content and approach
are essential in any adequate treatment of the subject. It is of special
interest and help to one who, while as a law student, enjoyed the rare
privilege of witnessing in person the delivery of the lectures comprising "The Nature of the Judicial Process", and was thus introduced to
Mr. Justice Cardozo's philosophic approach to the law.
DOUGLAS ARANT.

Birmingham, Ala.
Luck and Opportunity. By Francis L. Wellman.
Millan and Company. 1938. Pp. 214. $2.50.

New York: Mac-

Mr. Francis L. Wellman has been recognized for years as one of
the leading and most brilliant advocates of his time. No one at our
Bar has surpassed his achievements and his success in the trial of cases.
And then, his books on the subject of advocacy are very widely known
and esteemed by a large circle of readers including not only members
of the legal profession but intelligent laymen as well. He has rendered
a very great service by these books to those lawyers who appear in the
courts in the conduct of cases and legal proceedings. Also his style is
so vivid and the contents of his books are of such thrilling interest

that they give not only instruction but the most delightful entertainment to his readers.

In Luck and Opportunity Mr. Wellman has pre-

sented a most interesting sketch of his professional life, together with
some well-chosen examples of the great trials in which he has been
engaged, and finally he has elucidated to his readers his philosophy of
life and his undaunted outlook into the future. It is, in my opinion,
the best and the most useful of his writings. It deserves and will undoubtedly receive the close attention of many readers.
It is customary for the reviewer to approach his work in an impersonal and detached manner. But when he has been associated with
his author through many years, it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain such an attitude. Mr. Wellman first tells us most agreeably of
his boyhood and youthful years in his home in Boston, with sketches

of his parents and his family, and then of his time passed at Harvard
and the beginning of his law practice in the courts of Massachusetts.
He soon came to New York, where he received an appointment in the
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office of the Corporation Counsel of that city. Although he won success and fame in that office, he came more prominently into the public
eye when Delancey Nicoll, who was then District Attorney of New
York County, made him his chief trial assistant. In 1893 I became an assistant district attorney and served for about five years
under Mr. Nicoll and later under Colonel John R. Fellows. At
the time of my entry into the office Mr. Wellman was the chief
trial assistant. I well remember listening to him in court with the most
intense admiration. There were a number of cases of murder by
poisoning which attracted the public attention at that time in New
York. These cases, including those of Carlyle W. Harris, of Dr. Robert W. Buchanan, of Dr. Henry C. F. Meyer, and others, were prosecuted with transcendent ability and success by Mr. Wellman. He became and has continued to be a national figure in the ranks of the
great advocates of this country. It so happens, therefore, that I had
personal occasion to observe his work both as a public prosecutor and
afterwards as a trial counsel in our courts. For more years than I
now like to contemplate I have always had for him the highest admiration, esteem, and affection. In the course of my own professional
work I have met him in court; and I know personally his ability and
his achievements as a barrister He may truly be described as a genius
in his profession. He has an unfailing intuition as to the strong point
of his own case and as to the weakness of his adversary, which is
nothing short of marvelous. He has a power of exposition and of
argument before a judge or a jury that I have never seen excelled.
The familiar definition of genius as an infinite capacity for taking pains,
well applies to the powers of Mr. Wellman. He spares no effort in
the preparation and in the presentation of his cases. He is notably fair
in his court conduct, and he enjoys the esteem and confidence of the
judges before whom he appears and the lawyers with whom he is associated or against whom he contends. His mental alertness and vigor
he -has maintained not only by his professional work but by constantly
reading in fields beyond the strict scope of hi profession. By regular
relaxation and constant physical exercise he has kept his physical powers at a high pitch of efficiency throughout his life. As a result, and
with his tireless industry, 'he has accomplished an incredible amount of
professional work. There is in my judgment no one better qualified
to write for his profession as well as for laymen upon the conduct of
cases and upon the other lessons to be learned from such a career.
In Luck and Opportunity he describes very modestly but in a most
interesting fashion the methods used by him in his trials. He emphasizes the necessity for thorough and intensive preparation. In one instance, he studied all of the six thousand recorded cases of morphine
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poisoning in order to prove that a unique and ever-present symptom
of such poisoning is symmetrical contraction of the pupils of both
eyes. He was able to show that in the only case of unequal contraction of the pupils, which was relied on by opposing counsel, the victim
had a glass eye. The effect of this evidence was to destroy the defense
in the minds of the jury (p. 44). All who knew Mr. Wellman and his
methods realized that this kind of conscientious and laborious preparation equipped him to try his cases so brilliantly in court. We who are
familiar with the trial of cases appreciate that it is only this careful
study and examination beforehand that give the skilled advocate that
knowledge of his case and of the subject which enables him to present
his evidence and his arguments to the court and to the jury so brilliantly and so convincingly.
It is clear, therefore, that the brilliant, useful, and honorable life of
Mr. Wellman as an advocate affords a subject for most profitable and
interesting study. The young lawyer who desires to sit at the feet of
Gamaliel can find no better opportunity. The student of jurisprudence
and of trial procedure cannot do better than to read these annals of
Mr. Welman's legal experience. The stories of the famous trials in
which he participated are most intensely interesting. There is in my
opinion nothing so dramatic as a court case and of these the most dramatic is a criminal prosecution. There we are dealing with the very
warp and woof of human nature itself. No stage performance can
equal the interest, the suspense, and the anxiety that accompany a
criminal trial.But even more important and more enthralling than the stories of
his criminal trials, is -Mr. Wellman's statement of his philosophy of
life from its beginning to its end. I think it may safely be said that
his philosophy is so to guide and direct his life as to make the most of
the great powers with which nature endowed him, to use those powers
fairly as well as skilfully, to enjoy the society of his friends, and thus
to lead a life which will be pleasant and honorable as well as useful
and efficient. And finally, in his last two chapters he treats of Old
Age and Destiny in a most wise and fascinating manner. He advises
those who are ageing that they should not stop working or retire. As
to Destiny, he is a strong believer in immortality. It is incredible to
him, as it is to so many others, that there should not be some intelligent sequel to this life. As he puts it:
"5'The adventures and disciplines of youth; the struggles, failures
and successes, the pains and pleasures of maturity; the loveliness and
tranquility of age-these make up the fire through which one must
pass to bring out the pure gold of his soul. Having been thus per-
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fected, what shall nature do with him?
finite waste!'" (p. 207).

Annihilate him?

What in-

Thus he looks with confidence beyond the present bourne of time and
space. And assuredly no one is better qualified to speak on this subject than is Mr. Wellman. He has used his great powers to the utmost
through his long life. He has rendered a great service to his readers in
stating so clearly and with such dramatic force the lessons which he
has learned and the principles which he has followed.
GEORGE GORDON BATTLE.

New York City.
The Administrative Process. By James M. Landis. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1938. Pp. 160. $2.50.
This book is surely an important addition to the literature on "the
administrative process" in this country. There are few whose claim
to speak with authority on this subject is higher than that of Dean
Landis or perhaps we should say Commissioner Landis. This authority comes not only from active participation in the process as a
member of the Federal Trade Commission and later as Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission but also from many years of
sympathetic study. It is for this reason that one important feature
of his work is both disturbing and disappointing.
This is revealed in the introduction. "The administrative process",
we learn, has to do with new agencies of government whose functions
embrace the three aspects of government, that is, executive, legislative and judicial. "These agencies, tribunals, and rule making boards",
we are then told, "were for the sake of convenience distinguished from
the existing governmental bureaucracies by terming them 'administrative'" (p. 2). The expression "the administrative process" is then
applied to the variety of functions performed by these agencies. This
distinction evidently was useful to Dean Landis for it enabled him to
concentrate on the part played by the important regulatory bodies in
our government but others are not likely to find it either valid or
useful. The trouble is that Dean Landis has apparently set apart for
treatment on a functional basis those agencies that exercise regulatory
powers of some kind. There can be no quarrel with that. The quarrel
comes with his conception that only those bodies engage in "the administrative process". "The existing governmental bureaucracies" remain unspecified but, whatever functions they perform, they are in the author's
mind beyond the pale of "the administrative process". Dean Landis
is far from clear at this point. His analysis leaves much to guesswork
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on the part of the reader. The reader will search in vain for some
sure clue as to just what it is that differentiates "the existing governmental bureaucracies" from those agencies of government that engage
in "the administrative process". Is the difference dependent on whether
the agency is new or old, or whether it possesses executive, legislative
and judicial powers or only one or two but not all of these powers, or
whether it forms part of a regular department or is an independent
commission, or whether it performs regulatory or some other functions? The reader who goes through the book with these questions in
mind will find no sure answer and as long as the distinction is made
at all there should be an answer, for as it stands it does violence to
prevailing notions of public administration. Whenever and however
government acts to perform its appointed tasks there is public administration and the stuff and material that is the beginning of any problem
of the administrative process and administrative law.
With his subject limited in this fashion Dean Landis deals on a
functional basis with the many and important administrative agencies
that were created to deal with problems of a particular economic or
industrial activity or with particular matters that cut across industry
as a whole. These agencies are miniature governments vested with
legislative, executive, and judicial powers if you like. Carrying out
this thesis Dean Landis eliminates from consideration-and apparently from his notion of what is an "administrative agency" (p. 19)agencies that are merely courts, those that are concerned with the internal management of government, and those that are proprietary
agencies set up to conduct particular enterprises. It is interesting
though perhaps not surprising to find that Dean Landis champions the
independent commission form of organization over the departmental
form. At one point (p. 22) he disclaims as sterile any attempt to
classify administrative agencies according to whether or not they happen to be independent but in a later chapter on administrative sanctions he develops in detail the advantages of the independent commission over departmental organization (pp. 111-116). It is evident that
Dean Landis did not favor the recent proposals dealing with the reorganization of the executive branch of the government, at least in so
far as those proposals involved any subjection of the independent commissions to executive influence or control. It is curious that the proponents of the plan see in it a greater degree of public responsibility.
Dean Landis splits with them sharply at this point. He prefers the
"localization of responsibility" to the "traditional organizational charts,
which, like genealogical trees, stem in symmetrical form from one great
original source." This last is dismissed as "blue print symmetry"
while his own view is described as "realism in organization" (p. 28).
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The lines are sharply drawn but there is an important "if" that Dean
Landis states but does not discuss and it is this: the specialized and
independent agencies are fine and an increase in their number need not
disturb us "if appropriate coordination of their policies can be effected"
(p. 30). A great argument may some day range itself on each side of
that "if". Later in the book Dean Landis dismisses as "more apparent
than real" the likelihood that the policy of the independent commission
may run counter to the general direction of the executive and finds
the real danger in the possibility of inaction along some line (p. 116).
There follows an interesting chapter on the framing of policies
by the administrative. The appropriate spheres of discretion as between
the legislative and the administrative are discussed with particular emphasis on the dependence of even the so-called independent agencies on
other branches of government. It is Commissioner Landis who is
speaking with the wisdom born of experience when he tells of the
pressure exerted by. the legislative on the administrative through its
power of the purse and the insistent demands of patronage. Rule
making as it is practiced in England is advanced as a convenient device
to bring about a greater sharing of responsibility between the administrative and the legislative when action of an important sort is taken
in the form of a rule or regulation.
The chapter on sanctions contains an acute appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of the familiar combination of prosecutor and
judge in the administrative. The author makes a convincing plea for
further study of the whole matter of sanctions The final chapter deals
with the vexing problems of judicial review and Dean Landis hazards
an interesting guess that the future may see the judges accord some
degree of finality to administrative conclusions of law in matters where
the administrative is recognized as- having a special fitness to exercise
an informed and experienced judgment. There is a valuable suggestion,
too, dealing with the much criticized distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact. Dean Landis believes that the distinction
should be preserved and suggests that the decision in a concrete case
as to whether judge or administrator should have the last word on a
particular matter might well be determined with explicit consideration
of the special fitness of the one or the other to pass on it.
On the whole this is a refreshing and stimulating piece of work.
Throughout it there is constant emphasis on the important part played
by ideas taking shape in the form of statutes but stemming always from
a popular conviction that government today must perform many and
often quite new functions and that it must be adequately equipped to
perform them. To read these statutory mandates properly "one must
catch and feel the pace of the galvanic current that sweeps through the

